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ABSTRACT 
The importance of narratives in therapeutic processes such as convalescence, psychotherapy and 
counselling is well-established.  Such narrative-based approaches highlight the benefit of sense-making, 
coping and positive affect in circumstances of illness or psychological distress.  These phenomena are 
consistent with theories of narrative which emphasise contextualisation and the restoration of equilibrium.  
This paper proposes to open up further areas of enquiry by examining a range of theoretical models of 
narrative as an imaginative space. It will examine a selection of established models of narrative in literary 
and media disciplines, and identify some themes and categories which recur in the practice of story-telling 
– such as inevitability and agency, community and individuality, freedom and destiny, absurdity and 
purpose.  The paper will conclude by articulating some of the major themes that narrative suggests as a 
discipline, and which therefore might prove fruitful in understanding not only how story-telling plays a part 
in therapeutic processes, but how narrative might help to formulate a more generalized notion of well-
being. 
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THE SELF-ANNALIST 
 
The Reverend Robert Shields of Dayton, Washington, died in 2007 at the age of 89, leaving tens of 
millions of words of self-narration behind him.  Numerous news reports from the New York Times to Boing 
Boing noted his production of the world's longest diary, which he wrote in considerable detail, down to five 
minute intervals, pausing to sleep only for brief periods.  The vast majority of his output remains obscure 
since he bequeathed his diary to Washington State University on terms that will restrict its publication until 
50 years after his death.  However a few pages of his writing found their way onto the Internet following 
an interview with the reverend about his diligent self-documentation which aired on NPR in the mid 90s 
(Sound Portraits, 1994).  These pages, once digitised, were low-res but readable, and showed a few of 
the typed sheets listing the everyday events of 25 years of his life, from moments of metaphysical 
contemplation to frequent instances of bodily evacuation, as in this passage from the early morning of 
April 19th, 1994: 
 
12.30 – 12.55 I squatted on the throne and purged a #2, a slurry and slush and partly a 
solid state, while I read from the Swedenborg Concordance entries under End 
(conclusion, purpose, intent).  I meditated as I read.  Everything in man and of man is 
directed by, controlled by and governed by the end of his intentions, and his end is the 
purpose of his life's love.  All else is adventitous.  Whether the end is heavenly or not 
depends on whether the purposes are directed toward the good of the Lord, his church, 
and the neighbor, or towards one's own gratification.  I am earnestly examining myself 
in respect to my motivations. I honestly don't know what governs me. I don't know 
whether my goals are selfless or not.  In any case, the self seems to be in them.  Or is 
it?  I struggle with my thoughts.  
(Shields, 1994, i) 
 
On the subject of his intentions, there are conflicting accounts.  The recirculation at the time of his death 
of the few available diary extracts provoked speculation and comment: some parts of the press noted his 
completionist approach and wide vocabulary in describing urination (MailOnline, 2007); other parts of the 
web diagnosed him at best as an obsessive and at worst a candidate for “nutorama” (Neatorama, 2006); 
editorials warn us of the numbing mundanity of his diary (Turner, 1995); meanwhile he is included in a 
compendium of "eccentrics, visionaries, dreamers, believers" (Isay, 1997).  For his own part, he offers 
little in the way of explanation for his “self-annalising”.  In interview he confesses it to be an obsession, 
though he is not sure what he is trying to do.  He puts it down to his “make-up”, his “nature”; but also 
speculates that the diary with its encyclopedic detail and stuck-in nostril hairs may be of use to future 
historians and geneticists.  He allows himself a certain pride in his endeavour, describing it as 
“uninhibited” and "spontaneous”, "No restrictions. No holds barred".  “I'm doing something that no one 
else has ever done in the history of the world' he asserts, even though he confesses when asked why he 
writes: "I don't know why any of us do anything. That's the truth." (Turner, 1995) 
 
The demands of archive maintenance have an impact on his life of course: he doesn't leave town 
because being away overnight would get him behind - even shopping in the nearest city 30 miles away 
forces him to take notes which he then has to spend a day catching up on (Sound Portraits, 1994).  He 
has many achievements to his name - ghost-writing erotic stories, producing Civil War novels, as well as 
a career as a minister - but these appear to date from the period of life before he turned earnestly to 
diary-writing (The Cincinnati Post, 1996).  Leaving aside the interesting meeting of eroticist and 
ecclesiast, one might wonder whether he hasn't sacrificed living in favour of recording; but not keeping 
the diary, he says, would be like “stopping ... turning off my life”.  “I don't think it has happened unless I've 
written it down.” (Turner, 1995) 
 
Although the portrayals of Shields in the various news reports often invite us to consider his eccentricity 
as pathological - either sympathetically as unhealthily compulsive or more brutally as a sheer “nutcake” 
(Turner, 1995) - I want to avoid casting him in this role here if I can.  He illuminates for me an urge to self-
document which I recognise to some extent in myself and a multitude of self-archivists whose traces are 
daily accreting on the web in gigabytes.  He is at once a paragon of journal-writers, but an outlying 
anomaly offering an ambiguous warning and invitation.  The self-chronicle functions as a technology of 
the self - a device and process whereby selfhood is grasped and established as a form of intentionality - 
yet it instils a fear of obsession, self-absorption and narcissism.  So I want to use Robert Shields, as a 
foil, as a text - as a tool for thinking about the function of narrative in wellbeing.  As I will argue, narrative 
is often used as a device in therapeutic situations such as psychotherapy, since it seems to offer 
opportunities for self-understanding and transformation; as such it is worth investigating ways in which the 
broader concerns of narrative theory may point to a model of wellbeing.  Reverend Shields materialises 
an example of life as narrative, in which a person becomes both the object and subject of their own 
existence, ambiguously triangulated by an indefinite other: playwright, actor and spectator; narrator, 
protagonist and narratee.  These triple roles are, I will argue, crucial to a formulation of narrative as a tool 
for personal development and wellbeing.  Throughout this paper the reverend thus sits on his sun-porch 
with his 91 boxes of journal manuscript, begging questions of the claims I make, but reserving judgment 
on their fitness. 
 
 
NARRATIVE THERAPY 
 
The use of narrative is well-established in therapeutic situations.  John McLeod (1997) offers a way of 
understanding the use of story as part of a psychotherapeutic process by contrasting narrative knowing 
with paradigmatic knowing.  The latter emphasises abstract, propositional knowledge of the kind valued in 
scientific practices for its objectivity; the former by contrast emphasises the concrete knowledge of 
experience, context and significance.  Paradigmatic knowledge strives for factuality, eliminating ambiguity 
and subjective evaluation and as such proves useful in systematic inquiry and instrumental endeavours, 
but less useful in providing the scaffolding necessary for people to understand their own lives.  Narrative 
knowledge is precisely the kind of resource that makes it possible to contextualise facts into meaningful 
situations, and articulate the hazy significance that seems to surround human actions.  
 
McLeod itemises a number of ways in which narrative knowing, and story-telling generally, are helpful in 
therapeutic situations: stories, he notes, give us our own personal myths, helping us to handle the 
multiplicity of our of selves; they offer ambiguity, allowing space for interpretive and imaginative acts, and 
as such they are liminal, offering “threshold” experiences which can be personally transformative or 
cathartic; they have sequentiality and thus impel events into an order, reducing apparent chaos, helping 
us to solve problems, and assimilate the exceptional; and they are shared experiences, opening windows 
into each others' lives, forging social bonds and implying a moral landscape where they emerge around 
sites of social conflict.  (McLeod, 1997 pp28-53) 
 
These tensions between selfhood and, on the one hand, the multiple selves we seem to be, and on the 
other, the community of social identities we live amongst, also feature in Celia Hunt's account of the 
therapeutic dimension of autobiographical writing (2000).  She draws on Hesse's notion of a “melody for 
two voices” (Hesse in Hunt, 2000, p32) and Bakhtin's concept of polyphony to explore the reflective acts 
necessary for comprehending what we might usefully call the self for-the-self, and the self for-others.  For 
Hesse, the voices of the self both as self and as witness of the self are essential to breaking the 
unreflective absorption in life which breeds neurosis and peevishness.  Hunt suggests that opening up 
and creating distance between the witnessed self and the witnessing self allows the narrative identity of 
each to be clarified (p33).   Meanwhile Bakhtin's celebration of the polyphony of novelistic discourse, in 
which a writer allows the many varied voices of the novel's world to stand on an equal footing with the 
author's own voice, depends on the “exotopic” self - the self who is able to experience an “outsideness”, a 
protean ability to voice a "plurality of consciousnesses, with equal rights and each with its own world" 
(Bakhtin, 1984, p6).  The process of writing exotopically, notes Hunt, "demands a greater degree of 
psychic flexibility than would be usual in everyday life" (Hunt, 2000, p94).  
 
Thus the recognition of and intersubjective dialogue between multiple selves, both within the individual, 
and in a community of people, are crucial aspects of the therapeutic potential of narrative.  The act of 
writing is a reflective tool permitting us to open and explore facets of selfhood and otherness: the sense of 
the unitariness of the self and its multiplicity as many-in-one, the oneness of the self and its constitution 
as one-among-many.  But to state in this way the powerful scope for personal development that belongs 
to narrative opens further questions: does the capacity for nurturing wellbeing belong to all kinds of 
narrative experiences, or a particular kind?  Are writers the beneficiaries of a healthy habit, and ought we 
all to write?  Is the place of narrative in wellbeing reserved for the therapeutic situation, a tool to be 
applied in cases of illness and malaise, or is an engagement with narrative a more fundamental 
dimension of both being human and being well?   
 
I don't intend to provide exhaustive answers to these ambitious questions, but to begin outlining some 
broad conceptions of narrative that might suggest ways that it is implicated in wellbeing.  The use of 
narrative as therapeutic device which I've described could be seen as a way of considering some aspects 
of wellness which match the characteristics of story-telling.  I propose to reverse the direction of this 
movement, and instead try to draw out some key aspects of narrative and search for ways in which they 
match conceptions of wellbeing.  Meanwhile, I wonder whether the reverend listens to these suggestions 
and reflects on his own writing.  His words suggest he grapples with a faceted sense of self: "I struggle 
with my thoughts." (Shields, 1994, i) Are his goals selfless, and if he finds the self in them, what would it 
mean for the self to be absent?  As for the story - does his stupendous diary function as a narrative at all, 
or does the exhaustive documentation of every feature of life diminish the capacity to establish the 
significance of events?  When does a chronicle become a narrative, and must a narrative be selective in 
order to establish an order that is not merely factual and chronological? 
 
 
THE ARISTOTELIAN NARRATIVE 
 
Narrative theory has a long provenance - over 2000 years if we take Aristotle's Poetics as the first work of 
literary theory, as Richard Janko suggests in the introduction to his translation (Janko, 1987).  The 
Poetics defines a number of ways of thinking about what a narrative ought to be, and thus offers a set of 
prescriptive criteria whereby the art of epic poetry or tragic drama might be perfected.  Such instructions 
are intriguing of themselves, but I wish to draw out three features of Aristotle's analysis of tragedy which 
seem particularly relevant to the questions of selfhood and wellness.  These are mimesis, the 
verisimilitude of stories to real life; anagnorisis, the recognition of an authentic identity; and catharsis, the 
famous emotional 'purging' which the experience of narrative should facilitate. 
 
In an Aristotelian view, stories achieve their effect through their believable imitation of life, without which 
the suspension of disbelief would be impossible.  Inviting us into the diegesis, the world of the story, 
compels the author to present a familiar world like our own, a world of things and laws and events and 
causes, and of people whom we can recognise as like ourselves or as we'd like to be.  Recognition thus 
occurs at two levels, as we recognise the authenticity of the characters of the story, and those characters 
themselves discover either their own or each others' true nature - a key to Aristotle's understanding of 
tragedy.  The moment of recognition is often key to the emotional welling which should be aroused in us, 
since it depends on the hamartia of the protagonists - their mistakes and errors of misrecognition.  It is as 
witnesses to the ignorance and bloody-mindedness of our fictional counterparts whose misjudgements 
lead to their downfall that we experience pity for their lot and terror for our own.   
 
The cathartic effect which Aristotelian narrative aims for thus depends on the sharing of feeling - empathy 
for the plight of the tragic characters which manifests itself as a vicarious experience of the same 
emotions.  The exact means by which catharsis functions has been the object of debate.  Aristotle 
borrows the term from medicine where it refers to purification by purgation - the cleansing of the body of 
excesses.  Interpreting it in this way encourages us to understand the role of the vicarious experiences 
provoked by narrative as releasing extraneous emotions which will presumably become dangerous if they 
are allowed to stagnate.  Janko points out that this conception of catharsis suggests its purpose is best 
served by an audience of people who are disturbed and unbalanced, and its function is to ensure that 
their pent-up arousal doesn't escalate into hysteria (Janko, 1997, xvii).  Meanwhile, Janko's own 
proposition is that catharsis instead is a device for learning to feel the "correct emotion towards the right 
object, at the right time, to the proper degree" (xviii); narrative is then a rehearsal space in which we 
should be habituated into the correct responses towards people and actions, thereby becoming "tractable 
for education". (xviii) 
 
Both of these interpretations of catharsis entail an understanding of narrative which is normative - 
whether it is through prevention of hysteria or socialisation into the correct emotional composure.   The 
normative drive in Aristotelian theatre can be detected in the theatrical conventions that arose as the 
prescriptions of the Poetics were naturalised.  The protagonist ought to be someone 'above the common 
level', such that the events of their life are of no little consequence; tragedy should befall characters not 
as punishment for vice but as the consequence of human frailty; the unfolding of the drama should 
express unity of time, place and action thus maintaining the imitative mode.  The spectators of such 
dramas are often provided with an omniscient view of the helpless players, increasing the poignancy of 
dramatic irony, highlighting the catastrophe of inescapable fate and affirming the inevitability of the tragic 
outcome for the pawns in the world of the master author.  Goethe and Schiller at the end of the 18th 
century reinforce this sweeping surge of emotional vicarity and epic scope, writing that the spectator of 
this theatre must remain in "constant sensuous exertion, is not allowed to elevate himself to reflection, he 
must passionately follow, his imagination is completely reduced to silence, one is allowed to make no 
claim upon it, and even what is narrated, must be as if it were graphically brought before one's eyes". 
(Goethe & Schiller, 1827) 
 
It is precisely this immersion into passion, this tide of predestination and its concomitant silencing of 
imagination, that Bertolt Brecht later reacted against so strongly in his conception of a non-Aristotelian 
theatre.  Brecht famously argued in favour of the Verfremdungseffekt: alienation, distantiation and 
estrangement are all short-falling translations of this German term.  These negative renderings 
themselves hint at the pervasive triumph of cathartic absorption that Brecht so disliked.  Suzanne 
Langer's description of the misery of experiencing the shattering of the immersive illusion of a story 
captures all that was Brecht thought was wrong with the old bombastic theatre: 
 
I … remember vividly to this day the terrible shock of such a recall to actuality; as a 
young child I saw Maude Adams in Peter Pan. It was my first visit to the theater, and the 
illusion was absolute and overwhelming, like something supernatural.  At the highest 
point of the action (Tinkerbell had drunk Peter's poisoned medicine to save him from 
doing so, and was dying) Peter turned to the spectators and asked them to attest their 
belief in fairies.  Instantly the illusion was gone; there were hundreds of children, sitting 
in rows, clapping and even calling, while Miss Adams, dressed up as Peter Pan, spoke 
to us like a teacher coaching us into a play in which she was taking the title role.  I did 
not understand, of course, what had happened; but an acute misery obliterated the rest 
of the scene, and was not entirely dispelled until the curtain rose on a new set.  
(Langer in Ryan, 2001, p283) 
 
Misery and obliteration: Brecht notes that indignant reactions are the correct response to the broken 
diegesis of a traditional narrative.  Such a story presents itself as a self-contained, hermetically sealed 
world, outside which we must leave our imaginations when we enter; it presents a world of unchanging 
destiny, where disproportionate tragedy befalls people for their weakness or their hubris, rather than as a 
just punishment for their evil; and it is an ordered world of beginnings, middles and ends, in which the 
protagonists are powerless to escape their inevitable fates, since it is a world that is completely 
determinate, rational, explicable, inexorable.  No wonder that we should, as Aristotle puts it, "thrill with 
fear and melt to pity at what takes place" (Poetics, 53b15) - and no wonder, too, that, when the integrity of 
this spectacle disintegrates, we should, like Langer, crash to earth with misery and incomprehension. 
 
I interpret Langer's misery at the rupture of her immersion into the storyworld as a direct analogy to the 
“unhomeliness” that Heidegger notes arises when our own world of being is disrupted by the 
obtrusiveness and obstinacy of things that seem not to belong (Heidegger, 2008, p103 & p233) - indeed 
the fracturing of the coherence of our world by traumatic events and exceptional circumstances is a key 
aspect of our experience of anxiety and illness.  The order of our life and any sense of its providence 
descend into inexplicability and doubt.  The “letting-be” that Heidegger suggests consists in an authentic 
sense of being at home in the world is lost to a sense of estrangement and unbelonging (p405).  The 
unity of life, events and actions no longer coheres. 
 
9.00 - 9.05 I had to take a nitroglycerine tablet 
9.05 - 9.45 I sat on the fixture voiding urine and reading Swedenborg on End, England, 
other subjects.  I wish I knew something. Anything would do.  
(Shields, 1994, i) 
 
THE ESTRANGED NARRATIVE 
 
Brecht's alienation effect aimed at a different sort of defamiliarisation.  Martin Esslin notes in his study of 
Brecht that he thought the Aristotelian theatre was a fraud.  Instead he "demanded a theatre of calm 
contemplation and detachment, a theatre of critical thoughtfulness" (Esslin, 1969, p114), where 
audiences should think for themselves, rather then be swept away in emotion.   In his essay celebrating 
Chinese theatre, Brecht (1999) himself talks of a distance not only between the spectator and the world of 
the play, but between the actor and the role in which he is cast.  This distance ensures that the 
performance is not imitative, but an artistic rendering of character; the actor clearly knows he is a part of a 
performance, and the spectators do not surrender themselves to empathy, but instead enter a reflective 
mode and adopt a "watchful attitude" (Brecht, 1999, p14).  The alienation at work here, then, does not 
strive to drive a wedge between the world of the spectator and the world of the performance; rather the 
remoteness between audience and actor is reduced, while the storyworld they are experiencing, either as 
observers or as players, is pushed far enough away for it to become the object of their shared 
contemplation. 
 
One of the effects Brecht hoped to produce with this reorganisation of story, player and spectator was to 
historicise the drama.  The Aristotelian theatre emphasised the unchanging universality of events, while 
Brecht's epic theatre emphasised their particularity.  Aristotelian theatre proceeded inexorably toward 
endings, while Brecht's performers could "freely range forward and backward in time" (Esslin, 1969, 
p113).  Aristotelian theatre showed people at the mercy of fate, while Brecht's theatre invited the viewer to 
consider how things might have been otherwise.  Aristotelian theatre thrilled the audience into 
submission, while Brechtian theatre strove to stimulate them into reflection.  The challenge Brecht 
presented was to say that narrative was not there for us to learn the way of the world, but to provoke us 
into changing it.  Injustice is not merely a doom that befalls hapless victims at the hands of fate, but is 
something that is carried out by oppressors in ways that can be contested. 
 
In direct contrast to the normative tendency of the Aristotelian theatre, Brecht's theatre is avowedly 
political and aligned with the Marxist effort to disrupt dominant ideologies.  However, the function of 
narrative in this conception is aimed at restoring the dignity of the individual not only through the 
wholesale restructuring of the social order, but through the transformation of the individual's 
consciousness.  The Brazilian playwright Augusto Boal identified himself with the Brechtian tradition in his 
book Theatre of the Oppressed (1993), by critiquing what he called the “coercive” nature of Aristotle's 
system of tragedy, claiming that “spectator” is a bad word, since the "spectator is less than a man, and it 
is necessary to humanise him" (Boal, 1993, p134).  Boal conceives of the division of spectators from 
actors as an enclosing intervention by the ruling classes in the history of theatre.  He writes: "First they 
divided the people, separating actors from spectators; people who act and people who watch— the party 
is over! Secondly, among the actors, they separated the protagonists from the mass. The coercive 
indoctrination began! "  (Boal, 1993, p95)  Philip Auslander (1997) helps to clarify Boal's aims here, by 
placing his work in the context of Marx's concern for what is human: 
 
For Marx, alienation is pernicious primarily because it is dehumanizing: human beings, 
who are supposed to be autonomous, free subjects, endow things outside of 
themselves, whether another class, a deity, or the products of their own labor 
(commodities), with power over themselves and become slaves to those things. As I 
have suggested, Boal’s use of the basic categories of Marxism in his analysis of the 
body in performance suggests that, like Marx, Boal wants to overcome alienation and 
restore basic autonomy by eliminating actor and spectator in favor of the spect-actor, 
thus undoing the traditional division of theatrical labor and overcoming alienation (the 
audience’s surrendering of its autonomy to performers who act in its stead) and 
returning the “protagonistic function” [...] to the audience from which it was taken ...  
(Auslander, 1997, pp106-107) 
 
It is precisely the tendency to delegate human agency to things outside ourselves which Marx, Brecht and 
Boal aim to challenge.  Fetishism in both Marxism and in Freudian analysis refers to the way that potency 
is attributed to objects instead of human action.  Thus it is that thrill-seeking audiences surrender their 
emotional lives to the characters in Aristotelian tragedy, no less than they accept that they are just as 
powerless to intervene in their own fate as that of the tragic characters themselves.  Meanwhile the 
purpose of Brecht's Lehrstücke, experimental dramatic pieces in which the distinction between audience 
and actor is dissolved, and of Boal's 'forum theatre', in which audiences can intervene in an iterative 
unfolding of dramatic situations, is to restore autonomy to the individual human and remind them of their 
own radical empowerment.  After all, if we devolve our autonomy to objects and players to act and feel on 
our behalf, whether they are fetishes, actors, institutions or leaders, we have deferred both our ability and 
our responsibility to determine our own lives. 
 
From 'The Spokesman Review', 14th December 1995: 
 
He says the diary doesn't control him. He says he could quit. But he won't, even though 
a minor stroke a few years ago slowed his typing speed. […] 
"Some people would say 'Well, he's a nut,"' said Shields, seemingly unfazed by the 
prospect. "Maybe I am." He'd rather be called an eccentric. 
Asked if he worries about a fire or another stroke, Shields smiled like someone about to 
reveal a secret. "I don't worry about anything," he said. "Everything is in the hands of 
God."   
(Turner, 1995) 
 
PASTS AND FUTURES 
 
The tension between determinism and agency that is at the heart of the contrast between the dramatic 
tragedy of Aristotle and the epic theatre of Brecht, is implicated in the structure of narrative itself, and as I 
intend to argue, provides a way to understand how narrative is involved in a sense of wellbeing.  The self 
is in a tension between its future and its past, its intentions and its history, its destination and its 
provenance - and this is a tension at the heart of every narrative which is bounded by the role of the 
author.  Just as the author determines the intelligibility of the events of a story, so the self strives for 
authorship over its lifeworld, and the freedom of self-direction.  This freedom apparently entails a 
paradox, however: the same paradox that is inherent in an author devolving free will to a character, yet 
maintaining the integrity of that character's world.  
 
To help us understand the directedness of narrative, we can turn to Tvetan Todorov, the bulgarian 
philosopher, who proposed a very influential but essentially simple definition of narrative, which, he 
argues, is constituted by the progression from one state of equilibrium to another, through a stage of 
disequilibrium.  Todorov examines a story from Bocaccio's Decameron, arguing that the presentation of a 
cast of characters living in Naples is not enough to qualify as narrative - it is only when Bocaccio begins 
to transform the states of affairs and the attitudes of the characters that we can understand his tale as a 
narrative.  This transformation is an "unfolding of an action, change, difference" (Todorov, 1990, p28), and 
leads Todorov to the insight that narratives have two principles: succession and transformation (p30).  
Elements of stories are related to each other both by succession (following on from one another) and 
transformation (embodying change).   
 
At the heart of stories, then, are transformations: upsettings and degradations, restorations and reversals.  
Narratives which only tell part of this transformation (which perhaps only have the degradation without the 
restoration), are only “half a cycle” (p29).  To fulfil a complete cycle, a narrative must unfold and present 
succession; it requires transformation, and moves towards endings and resolutions - thus, narrative 
points at an implied future.  Perhaps for this reason, Todorov says that death has an “exceptional 
narrative status” (p38): it is a reversal which cannot be restored other than in exceptional narratives - the 
logic of the non-exceptional narrative implies a future which death exceptionally negates.   
 
Todorov pushes us towards a notion of a narrative as something that resolves, and that completes cycles.  
The structures of these transformations are implicit in their designation as “restoration” or “reversal”, and 
in the exceptionality of death.  He notes, "the passage from A to non-A is in a way the paradigm for all 
change" (1990, p30) and thus sets up a dialectic between the successive elements of stories such that 
they are co-defined.  The nature of the state of disequilibrium, which narrative demands must follow an 
initial equilibrium, is therefore derived from that initial state of affairs and the nature of its disturbance.  
Just as every action has an equal and opposite reaction, so narrative sequences must be articulated with 
each other.  From this causal structure, future states of affairs are also defined.  Many narratives may 
gain their appeal from striving to obfuscate what the nature of that implied future might be, but in 
Todorov's scheme, that implied future is limited to new states of equilibrium which are configured by the 
preceding succession of events. 
 
Jean-Paul Sartre provides a sense of the importance of this implied future.  He offers a powerful 
phenomenological insight into what it is like to realise the freedom of self-direction in his novel Nausea 
(2000), whose name has already told us much about the experience.  His protagonist's realisation that the 
freedom of self-determination comes at the price of absurdity throws him into an anguish in which he feels 
crushed.  I cannot have both a sense that I have had a meaningful life journey leading to the present 
moment, and have a completely open future in which I can direct my actions in any way I like.  To have 
had a meaningful trajectory to the present, I must have a purpose whose imperative limits my freedom if I 
am to remain faithful to that purpose; to have complete self-determination renders whatever actions I take 
absurd - literally, meaningless.  The existential dilemma is that one can choose one or the other - purpose 
or freedom - but never both.   
 
... for the most commonplace event to become an adventure, you must - and this is all 
that is necessary - start recounting it [...] a man is always a teller of tales, he lives 
surrounded by his stories and the stories of others, he sees everything that happens to 
him through them; and he tries to live his life as if he were recounting it.  But you have 
to choose: to live or recount […] When you are living, nothing happens.  
(Sartre, 2000, pp60-61) 
 
We find ourselves doubly caught here - if we wish to make sense of our lives, we find ourselves turning 
between the future-headed path to which our life-narrative directs us, and the retrospective sense we 
must make of our journey on that path in order to give our future a shape; or if we wish for total autonomy, 
we will be suspended between the vertiginous, nauseating experience of infinite possibility, and the denial 
of any purpose to the events which have led us to the here and now.  Meaning is oppressive; freedom is 
absurd.  To free ourselves into an indeterminate future, we must sacrifice any sense of articulation in the 
succession of events in our lives, or, if we follow Todorov, recast our narrative as mere description.   
 
2.05 – 2.10 I was at the keyboard of the IBM Wheelwriter making entries for the diary. 
2.10 – 2.25 I rested on the couch. 
2.25 – 2.35 I checked on whether our county tax payment had been received. It had. We 
were shuttling back and forth between the ledger, the study and the telephone. 
2.35 – 3.00 I rested on the couch. 
3.00 – 3.25 I read the Walla Walla Union-Bulletin. Matthew F[…] tried to take a baby from 
Walla Walla General Hospital.  He assaulted four of the nursing staff, who held him for 
the police.  He was charged with custodial interference and with assaulting the nursing 
staff.  Boise Cascade’s loss of $421 million over the last 13 quarters has “embarrassed” 
the chairman of the board and Chief Executive Officer, but he will not quit. 
3.25 – 3.35 I was at the keyboard of the IBM Wheelwriter making entries for the diary. I 
drank two cups of orange juice. 
3.35 – 4.30 I prepared a 10-ounce tin of Campbell’s vegetable soup and ate it with 
saltines as I read Mr. Lincoln’s Army by Bruce Catton.  I washed out the soup pan and a 
frozen food tray left by Cornelia. 
4.30 – 4.35 I was at the keyboard of the IBM Wheelwriter making entries for the diary. 
(Shields, 1994, iii - iv) 
 
ANNALIST AND ANALYST 
 
Contrary to Todorov's assertion that description alone does not qualify as narrative, a strand of thought 
that I will trace through Louis Mink, Arthur Danto and Paul Ricoeur suggests that there is no substantial 
difference between history and narrative; thus there is no chronological account of events that does not 
impose narrative order onto them, no description of events that is not "always already" structured by 
narrative.  And if this is the case, then the existential autonomy which Sartre describes is unobtainable, 
and in any case, it doesn't play a helpful role in a conception of wellbeing which is grounded in sense-
making, belonging or self-direction.   
 
In debates about the value of narrative in the discipline of history, Louis Mink has argued that narrative is 
a primary cognitive form, rather than a derivative one.  Hence, instead of thinking of narrative as a device 
by which a historian might present events of the past, he asserts that when historians present histories, 
the entire processes of research, selection, comprehension and dissemination are structured by narrative.  
Thus, events "are not the raw material out of which narratives are constructed; rather, an event is an 
abstraction from a narrative"  (Mink, 2001, p220).  To speak of a "narrative of events" is a tautology, since 
it is the narrative form of understanding that defines and constructs an event as such: its commencement, 
its closure, its causal connectedness and its transformative significance - these are the narrative criteria 
by which it can be construed as an event at all. 
 
An objection to Mink's line might be that since narrative knowing, as it has been developed by McLeod, is 
attuned to the ambiguity and significance of events, it cannot therefore get at the facts of the matter.  
Narrative processes are partial and selective, rather than objective and comprehensive.  An ideal history 
in this conception would precisely be a "non-narrative" - a pure record of everything.  Arthur Danto 
imagines this ideal history, in the shape of the "Ideal Chronicler" (I.C.), (Danto, 1965, p149) who is a 
godlike figure with the powers of omniscience and instantaneous transcription, recording every action and 
event, every thought and motive: "everything that happens across the forward rim of the Past is set down 
by him, as it happens, the way it happens." (p149) We might imagine the mortal historian is now 
redundant, since the work of recording a faithful history of the past is taken care of.  Alternatively we may 
ascribe to the fallen historian a new role, whose task it is to use the I.C as evidence as though it were an 
eye-witness account.  The point, Danto urges, is that even though all of history is laid before us, it will still 
not tell us everything we wish to know about events.  Even a complete account of the past is not enough.  
"The truth concerning an event can only be known after, and sometimes only long after the event has 
taken place," he tells us, and crucially, that what we “neglected to equip the Ideal Chronicler with was 
knowledge of the future." (p151) 
 
I take Danto's argument to be that just as the significance of past events changes as the catalogue of new 
events is enlarged in the passage of time, so readings of history are shaped by an anticipation of the 
future.  "Our knowledge of the past […] is limited by our knowledge (or ignorance) of the future."  (p18) 
And just as much as we are able to make claims about the past, just so much are we also making claims 
about the future.  The horizon of our interpretive action moves forward and backward in time, like the 
estranged Brechtian performer whose character's destiny resists being fixed.  Our intentions for the future 
shape how we view our past, while what sense we draw from our journey into the present shapes our 
future purpose. 
 
I find the figure of the "last historian" helpful here: succeeding in bringing to light the truth of history will 
also be to succeed in predicting the shape and significance of the future.  Danto compares this striving 
with prophecy itself - to see the present as though from the future (p9).  The last historian must see the 
past from the perspective of the end of time - the last, exceptional narrative event of history.  It is in this 
sense that we all strive to be the last historians of our own life-narratives.  To assimilate the past and 
future into an articulate form, we interpret the past from an imagined future, and the future from an always 
re-imagined past.    
 
Paul Ricoeur borrows terminology from Mink to express this double mode of narrative apprehension:  
 
The art of narrating, as well as the corresponding art of following a story, therefore 
require that we are able to extract a configuration from a succession […] every narrative 
can be conceived in terms of the competition between its episodic dimension and its 
configurational dimension, between sequence and figure […] to narrate and to follow a 
story is already to 'reflect upon' events with the aim of encompassing them in successive 
totalities. 
(Ricoeur, 1981, p278) 
 
It is in the movement of configuration that we may see narrative implicated as an existential aspect of 
wellbeing.  The extent to which we are able to apprehend the totality of a life from its discrete episodes, 
including those phases of it which have not yet occurred, ensures that we are able to feel both purpose 
and self-direction - indeed they become the one and the same.  Ricoeur's own approach to expressing 
and resolving the tension between the discreteness and continuity of self that is captured in a single 
figure of many parts is to consider the duality implied in the word "identity" itself.  Using the terms “idem-
identity” and “ipse-identity”, (1994, pp165-168) Ricoeur draws attention to identity as both sameness and 
selfhood.  The idem-identity is that which is recognisable as the same, unchanging self, and asserts itself 
as the recurring identity that is and will be continuous through all the moments of a life.  The ipse-identity 
is that which is present at any given moment - the one who voices the words, "Here I am!"  It is in what 
Ricouer calls a "narrative identity" that the idem and the ipse meet, since it is only through access to the 
experience of self-sameness (idem) that the self (ipse) is able to answer the question "Who am I?" 
 
To conclude, I wish to take these understandings from the writers and thinkers I have touched on, and in 
so doing I also suggest that these are the some of the models of wellbeing that theories of narrative can 
offer: As much as I am willing to absolve myself of my autonomy by permitting others to define and direct 
me, just so much I become a spectator of my own life rather than its protagonist, living through vicarious 
emotions and fearing the dispersal of an illusion over which I have little control. Yet, if I am able to 
apprehend my life as meaningful, in even the merest details, then I begin to be the creator of my own life-
story.  Without access to the dimension of the self with a history and a mortal future, my self is no self at 
all.  The self which emerges for me at their intersection is justified in feeling that my life-narrative is 
coherent: the many episodes of my life are articulated into a unified whole, and the self-authorship of this 
“configuration” offers me a sense of self-determination. A pure freedom, which detaches itself from my 
past, is desirable only in so far as I am willing to forgo a sense of historical identity and personal heritage; 
but a directedness to a future which is faithful to my journey to the present is what gives my life purpose. 
 
CODA 
 
The Reverend Shields' diary is exhaustive, but if our guides have been right, there is no chronicle that is 
not a narrative, and therefore no diary which does not aim to configure events and episodes into a totality.  
In Washington State University are tens of millions of his words, of which we have read only a miniscule 
extract.  Many of them inventively describe urination, and attract our prurient attention.  Some of them 
elicit pathos, and provoke curiosity.  A few might even seem mundane, but as Mink notes, annals are 
“fascinating to the teller, whose recollections they are, and boring to the listener, who has only the 
pointless story without the vividness of recollected content.” (Mink, 1981, p780) But some of them invite 
us to see a glimpse of the self of their author on the page, and his apprehension of his own life.  The 
reverend is reading from the The Swedenborg Concordance, a reference work which accompanies the 
theological writings of Emmanuel Swedenborg, a philosopher, scientist, theologian and, in the latter part 
of his life before his death in 1772, a mystic.  He is claimed to have predicted the date of this own death.  
He refers often to the “proprium” – an archaism referring to properties that belong to something – what is 
its “own”.  His concordance tells us that the flesh is the "proprium of man, thus the evil of the love of self”, 
and the “voluntary proprium of man, which in itself is nothing but evil … Fully ill.” (Swedenborg in Potts, 
1888, pp816-817) 
 
1.05 - 1.10 I lip-read Psalm 97 
1.10 - 1.30 I affirmed my conviction in the faith of the heavens: 1) The Lord reigns; 2) The 
Lord is the life of all; 3) All salvation is of mercy; and 4) The proprium is evil.  Then I 
reviewed the things I want most before this life is over: 1) To write Thunder in Heaven or 
Up With the Star or both; 2) to endow the University so as to perpetuate the preservation 
of my papers; 3) to use the annuity to help six people and six causes.  But I conceived of 
a way to do that.  I would give the whole of the WSU annuity to the American Bible 
Society and use the annuity from the ABS to help the six people and the causes.  I would 
save a bundle in taxes, both immediate and deferred, by doing this, and would bestow an 
immense benefit on the American Bible Society which is dear to my heart.  I give credit 
for this intention to the Divine Providence.  I realize that the achievement of any of those 
goals is the Lord's doing; it is marvelous in our eyes. 
(Shields, 1994, i) 
 
 
 
 
GLOSSARY 
 
agency – the power of acting, or exerting one’s will in order to effect the course of events. 
anagnorisis – Aristotle’s term for ‘recognition’ – the crucial moment of realisation in which a person or 
character either recognises someone’s authentic identity, or senses their own genuine nature, as if for the 
first time; the discovery or revelation of the truth. 
articulation – more than speaking, to articulate is to be able to connect things and join them together – 
such as words, sentences, ideas or narrative sequences.  
catharsis – literally, ‘purging’; a term Aristotle borrowed from medicine to refer to the arousal and release 
of emotion through dramatic narrative. 
dialectic – a heavily burdened word which refers to processes in which divergent views or positions are 
played out, through argument, conversation, dialogue or conflict, hopefully towards reconciliation; an 
unfolding of point and counterpoint. 
diegesis – the term borrowed from Greek to refer to the world of a narrative; the internal integrity of the 
storyworld, which is filled with people, places and customs which belong to that world. 
exotopy – literally meaning ‘outsideness’, this term is used by Mikhail Bakhtin to refer to the ability of an 
author to ‘speak’ the authentic voices of characters other than their own. 
fetishism – the transference of one’s own agency to a symbolic proxy; e.g. sexual arousal through 
objects (Freudian fetishism), or allocation of value away from human labour and onto commodities 
(Marxian commodity fetishism). 
hamartia – mistakes and errors of misrecognition, frequently a crucial element in ancient tragedies 
whose protagonists often fail to recognise someone they ought to know. 
intentionality – in phenomenology, ‘intentionality’ refers to the ‘directedness’ of conscious experiences – 
always towards objects, concepts, feelings and perceptions; hence it is related to but not the same as the 
common understanding which implies purpose and motive. 
mimesis – a Greek term used by Aristotle to refer to the ‘likeness’ of stories to the real world – their 
imitative capacity. 
narratee – the implied or actual audience to whom a story is directed. 
narrative – at its simplest, a narrative is a telling or re-telling of a series of events which are connected. 
narrative configuration – Louis Mink and Paul Ricoeur use the term ‘configuration’ to refer to the dual 
act of being able to grasp the different component or sequences of a narrative, while also apprehending 
the story as a whole, unified structure.  Narrators and narratees, authors and readers, writers and 
audiences, all must be able to see both the figure of the entire story, and the sequences from which it is 
composed. 
polyphony – a term used by Mikhail Bakhtin to refer to the diversity of languages and voices that are 
present in the many strata of societies, the different eras of history, or the lines of great literature. 
protagonist – the lead role in the story, the main actor in the drama, the self of the individual’s 
storyworld. 
spect-actor – Augusto Boal’s terms for the new fusion of spectator and actor he wishes to bring about in 
both his drama and wider society. 
technology of the self – a term coined by Michel Foucault to refer to the means and techniques by 
which the self is shaped, both internally by the individual, and externally by influences outside the 
individual’s control. 
unhomeliness – a neologism created by the translation of Heidegger’s term ‘unheimlich’; I prefer 
unhomeliness since it implies a non-supernatural lack of a sense of belonging, rather than the word 
‘uncanny’ which is sometimes used as a translation. 
Verfremdungseffekt  - Brecht’s term for drawing attention to the artifice of dramatic performance – 
variously translated as ‘defamiliarisation’, ‘estrangement’, ‘alienation’ and ‘distanciation’; a mechanism 
whereby the illusion of narrative is punctured in order to highlight the highly contingent and constructed 
nature of stories and their worlds. 
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